Tag: supreme court

Supreme Court says corporations cannot be used to evade Constitution

The recent non-HOA decision by the US Supreme Court in DOT v. Assn American Railroads[i] has a direct bearing on the constitutionality of the HOA legal scheme.   This case dealt with the legal status of AMTRAK — is it or is it not a government entity — and was there an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.  While I have argued that HOAs are de facto private governments based on their powers, authority and functions, I now make the argument that as a de jure (according to the law) private corporation, HOAs have been unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers. “[R]ecognizing that the power to fashion legally binding rules is legislative.”[ii]

Implicit delegations of legislative powers are described in The Restatement Servitudes[iii] and numerous state statutes carry implicit delegations of legislative powers.[iv]

With respect to violations of the Constitution, the Supreme Court decision in DOT  held 1) that private parties cannot draft agreements to circumvent the Constitution by declaring that an entity, specifically a corporation, is a private organization, 2) that such a determination is made by the courts based on the corporation’s functions, powers and authority, and 3) that in order for a private entity’s delegation of legislative authority to be constitutional, there must be control, supervision and accountability to the state.

I have presented my case that, in the absence of explicit enabling acts, there is implicit unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private HOAs, particularly in regard to legally binding rules, without accountability.

Read the complete paper at Delegation.

[i] Dept. of Transportation v. Assn American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225 (2015)

[ii] Supra 1, p. 17.

[iii] Restatement Third, Property (Servitudes), Susan F. French, Reporter, p. ix (American Law Institute 2000).

[iv] For a sample of implied rulemaking statutes by state, see:  Arizona: ARS 33-1803(A) and (B) for HOAs; 33-1242(A)(1) for condos. California: Civil Code §§ 4340-4370 (Part 5, Chapter 3, Article 5, Operating Rules). Florida HOAs:  Title XL, § 720 et seq. do not explicitly address rules per se, but speak to enforceable “guidelines” and “standards”; Florida Condos:  Title XL, § 718 et seq. (in particular, § 718.1035, the general statement on “association rules”). Nevada: “NRS 116.31065  Rules.  The rules adopted by an association” (with 5 “musts” imposed on the HOA).

CC&Rs are a devise for de facto HOA governments to escape constitutional government

This commentary takes a long look at the validity of HOA covenants and the need for judicial enforcement in order to invoke state action with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms.   It informs the reader that such enforcement depends upon the member’s voluntary agreement to be bound by the declaration, and raises issues of the lack of genuine agreement.  The agreement requirement is not analyzed under contract law, but under HOA law that has been designed to protect the HOA and position the declaration as the supreme law of the HOA community.

Long ago in 1994 Professor McKenzie wrote, “HOAs currently engage in many activities that would be prohibited if they were viewed by the courts as the equivalent of local governments.[i]

Two years after Marsh v. Alabama[ii] — the 1946 Supreme Court opinion setting the misguided “public functions” test for a municipality — the Court specifically dealt with the question of the constitutionality of restrictive covenants.  The issue in Shelly v. Kraemer[iii] was “that judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases has violated rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment.”

With respect to restrictive covenant enforcement the Shelly court said:  “That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State [‘state action’] within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court. . . . The federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its legislative, executive, or administrative branch of government.”   The Court held “that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand” (my emphasis).

Unfortunately, the Court chose a narrow view of this issue limiting it to that involving racial discrimination.  A more expansive application of the 14th Amendment can easily be applied to any covenant that violates a member’s rights, freedoms or privileges and immunities as a citizen, but that has not been the case.

The 1976 Florida case, Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home,[iv] directly addressed the question of an HOA declaration and its actions under the Declaration.  It used the Marsh “public functions” test and the additional “close nexus” test (HOA action is closely resembles government action). No state action was found.  The HOA was not like a company town and the state’s involvement, as occurred in the limited context of the case, was not a close nexus.

Please understand that CC&RS and covenants are not automatically invalid or unconstitutional.  It requires a court to declare them so, at the expense of a homeowner lawsuit.  

Also, it is important to note that the court question was not about the validity of a restrictive covenant itself, but the court enforcement of that covenant. (This requires a lawsuit in which the court upholds the covenant and a subsequent lawsuit charging a violation of the 14th Amendment.)  The Shelly court’s view was that as the 14th Amendment applied “only to governmental action, as contrasted to action of private individuals, there was no showing that the covenants, which were simply agreements between private property owners, were invalid.”   Furthermore, “[The 14th] Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful” (my emphasis).  In Arizona, today, the appellate court is to decide whether a CAI attorney amendment to Terravita’s CC&Rs that directly contradicts state law will be held valid.[v]  Behold the power of private contracts!

In view of the above we can ask, what makes a valid agreement?  Fortunately, a condition was attached to this view, which is never ever mentioned by pro-HOA supporters including those renowned CAI attorneys: “So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms.”  Sadly the courts have unquestionably accepted the validity of the CC&Rs as a voluntary agreement and this consent to be bound has become legal doctrine. For example, in Midlake v. Cappuccio the PA appellate court upheld a valid consent to agree by the buyer at time of purchase: “The Cappuccios contractually agreed to abide by the provisions in the Declaration at the time of purchase, thereby relinquishing their freedom of speech concerns regarding placing signs on this property.”[vi]   There have been numerous other cases where the court has upheld a valid consent to agree per se and a waiver/surrender of constitutional rights under said holding.

But, is there a genuine consent to agree?  I have written several commentaries about the lack of a genuine consent to agree as a result of misrepresentation, fraud, half-truths and hidden factors not fully disclosed to homebuyers.[vii]  Certainly not according to contract law 101 with its requirements for full disclosure, a meeting of the minds, and absence of fraud.

Unfortunately, once again, HOA declarations and covenants are seen as a law unto themselves that is based on a cutting and pasting of various laws, including constitutionality law, to provide for the protection and survival of HOAs.  We have pro-HOA statutes in every state and a Restatement of Servitudes[viii] (covenants) that was written to promote and protect HOAs. “Therefore this Restatement is enabling toward private government, so long as there is full disclosure”[ix] (my emphasis).

The Restatement advises judges — and is regarded as precedent — that its collection of laws known as HOA law dominates all others.   Section 6.13, comment a, states: “The question whether a servitude unreasonably burdens a fundamental constitutional right is determined as a matter of property law, and not constitutional law”. Section 3.1, comment h, states: “in the event of a conflict between servitudes law and the law applicable to the association form, servitudes law should control.”

And we have CAI, the national HOA lobbying organization, repeatedly making it clear that the HOA is a city-state, an independent principality, and the decisions of the HOA are the supreme law of the community.[x]  It is easily concluded why CAI has vehemently denied and opposed any reference or declaration that HOAs are de facto governments — mini or quasi-governments — and argue that HOAs remain free from constitutional restrictions on government entities.

HOAs have been institutionalized under this state of affairs, this public policy, and unquestionably accepted as this is the way it is.  Nothing will improve the conditions to which HOA residents are subject unless HOA public policy changes. Public policy today rejects constitutional government for HOAs and allows HOAs to operate outside the law of the land.

The policy makers fail to understand that the terms and conditions of the HOA CC&Rs cross over the line between purely property restrictions to establishing unregulated and authoritarian private governments.

 

References

[i] Evan McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowners Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Governments, Yale Univ. Press, 1994.

[ii] Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The holding was that a company town was no different from a municipal town.

[iii] Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

[iv] Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home, 502 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1987). This case was a civil rights violations case based on 42 US 1983 as a result of various acts by the HOA.

[v] Brown v. Terravita, 1 CA-CV 14-455. See Will Arizona allow HOA covenants to dominate state laws? and  Does the Constitution support the will of the HOA no matter what?

[vi] Midlake  v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340 (Pa.Super. 1996) (PA appellate court). .

[vii] See “Consent to be governed, No. 4,” HOA Common Sense: rejecting private government;  Proposed “consent to be governed” statute, the “Truth in HOAs” bill; and court examines consent and surrender of rights in HOA CC&Rs.

[viii] Restatement Third, Property: Servitudes (American Law Institute 2000).

[ix] Id., From the Forward: “Professor Susan French [Reporter (chief editor/contributor) for this Restatement] begins with the assumption . . . that we are willing to pay for private government because we believe it is more efficient than [public] government  . . . . Therefore this Restatement is enabling toward private government, so long as there is full disclosure . . . .”

[x] See CAI: the HOA form of government is independent of the US Constitution;  Misrepresentation: CAI comes with unclean hands and Will the real CAI standup: its contradictory beliefs, pronouncements and goals.

HOA constitutionality will cause the collapse of CAI

Ever wonder why CAI so vehemently fights the view that HOAs are indeed mini-governments, or quasi-governments?  Its amicus curiae brief in Dublirer v. 200 Linwood Avenue[1]  is a meritless, desperate attempt to prevent the NJ Supreme Court from coming to the conclusion that as a government, the HOA election process must be constitutionally protected.  It failed. The Court upheld constitutional rights to a member’s free speech especially in regard to HOA campaigning.

CAI argued that HOAs are businesses and that business owners don’t have constitutional protections.  It practically begged the Court not to allow open public discussions of political issues, because the HOA would lose its privacy rights. Isolationist mentality!  It argued that constitutional protections are not needed because other mechanisms, like the business judgment rule, would handle disputes.  And, that election rights are not protected by the state constitution, but by the pro-HOA statutes and adhesion CC&R contracts.  To paraphrase a line from the movie, The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, “We don’t need no stinkin’ constitutional protections!”

Such statements made in court filings are astonishing!  It is a complete refutation and about face to CAI’s propaganda material made for public consumption.[2]  It repudiates our democratic system of government and the US Constitution!

What would cause CAI to argue such statements without merit before a state supreme court?  Maybe because CAI knows that if HOA constitutionality is accepted and HOAs are seen as state actors or made to become state entities, it would no longer control and dominate the industry.  All would be lost!

HOAs would not be lost as CAI has argued from time to time.  CAI would be lost!  It would have to rethink its public policies, its Best Practices, it training seminars, etc.  It would need to include such courses, which are not and never have been in the CAI vocabulary, understanding the Constitution and Bill of Rights, good local government, best city management practices, etc.

The path to substantive HOA reform legislation has always been on the basis fundamental principles, democratic principles of government, and the US Constitution.  The courts are beginning to see the error of their way.  And CAI cannot prevent the inevitable from happening — it’s just a matter of how soon!

References

1.    See CAI: the HOA form of government is independent of the US Constitution.

2.    See Misrepresentation: CAI comes with unclean hands and Will the real CAI standup: its contradictory beliefs, pronouncements and goals.

From NJ Supreme Court Twin Rivers to Dublirer: HOAs are separate but unequal governments

In a parallel that can be made with Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537,1896) and its enlightened reversal in Brown v. Bd of Education (347 U.S. 483,1954), the NJ Supreme Court’s opinion in Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Avenue Owners (2014) accomplished the same necessary correction of its earlier opinion in CBTW v. Twin Rivers (929 A.2d 1060, 2007) with respect to HOA constitutionality.

In Plessy, the “separate but equal” doctrine was developed to uphold segregationist laws. In Brown, it was successfully argued that “separate but equal” did not apply to the education of black children and integrated schools were necessary.

(I have read the court filings and briefs in the following cases thanks to the people at the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic, Frank Askin, Director).

In Twin Rivers, addressing the one issue of many dealing with the equivalent of separate but equal free speech for HOA members, the Court found that alternate means of member free speech was available – that is, the alternate methods were separate but equal – and upheld the constitutionality of the HOA’s restrictions.  The HOA was not open to the public and was entirely a private entity and not a municipality (factual statement).

The trial court favored the HOA, while the appellate court favored the members. “In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, holding that the Association was subject to state constitutional standards with respect to its internal rules and regulations.”

At the NJ Supreme Court,

Plaintiffs [homeowners] asserted that the community room policy denied them equal protection of the laws and unreasonably and unconstitutionally violated their right to access the community room on a fair and equitable basis. They sought temporary and permanent injunctions “to allow [p]laintiffs to utilize the community room in the same manner as other similarly situated entities.

They urge that political speech is entitled to heightened protection and that they should have the right to post political signs beyond the Association’s restricted sign policy. Plaintiffs further contend that the excessive fees charged for the use of the community room are not reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the Association. Finally, plaintiffs claim that the State Constitution requires that the Association publish plaintiffs’ views on an equal basis with which the Association’s views are published in its newspaper.

The NJ Supreme Court held,

We conclude that the limited nature of the public’s invitation to use the property does not favor a finding that the Association’s rules and regulations violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

We find that the minor restrictions on plaintiffs’ expressional activities are not unreasonable or oppressive, and the Association is not acting as a municipality.

In Dublirer,

The [condo] Board, citing a ‘House Rule’ that barred soliciting and distributing any written materials, denied the request. On prior occasions, though, the Board had distributed written ‘updates’ under apartment doors throughout the building, which criticized the Board’s opponents. The resident filed a lawsuit and claimed that the House Rule was unconstitutional.

The panel [appellate decision] noted that Dublirer’s expressional activity was ‘political-like speech’ because it related to the management and governance of the common-interest community. The panel found that the restriction left Dublirer without reasonable alternative means to convey his message.

Thus, even though Dublirer did not run for public office, his message was akin to and should be treated as political speech, which is entitled to the highest level of protection in our society. . . . If anything, speech about matters of public interest, and about the qualifications of people who hold positions of trust, lies at the heart of our societal values. . . . We therefore find that the Board’s House Rule violates the free speech guarantee in New Jersey’s Constitution.

So we see how the NJ Supreme Court recognized the de facto political government nature of HOAs, representing a shift in attitude from ‘HOAs are just businesses’ agreed to by its members to the need for constitutional protections. The Court essentially declared that the HOA’s restrictions in regard to campaigning were not separate but equal methods as used by the board itself.  Further, it appears that this Court believes that HOAs are akin to public governments and the election of board members is tantamount to a local public election and must be constitutionally protected.

To ensure that local community government works for the member-owners, shouldn’t due process protections and the equal protection of the laws under the 14th Amendment require judicial support and enforcement against HOA violations?  And that these rights deserve supremacy over privately drafted contracts that have as their objective the dismissal of constitutional protections?  I think so!  So should state legislators!

The unclean hands of the HOA

I have spoken of the unclean hands of the HOA in “HOA Common Sense No.4, Consent to be governed” and in “No.8, Draconian punishment and intimidation.”  Unclean hands is a legal doctrine that denies a plaintiff’s (HOA) complaint if the plaintiff has done anything wrongful or unfair relating to the issue at hand. If a defendant (homeowner) can show the plaintiff had “unclean hands,” the plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed or the plaintiff will be denied judgment.

In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v US  (1928)[1] Justice Brandeis wrote (my emphasis),

The governing principle has long been settled. It is that a court will not redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands. The maxim of unclean hands comes from courts of equity. But the principle prevails also in courts of law. Its common application is in civil actions between private parties. Where the government is the actor, the reasons for applying it are even more persuasive.

The court’s aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then aid is denied despite the defendant’s wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination.

This doctrine also applies to the government at all levels.  As Brandeis continued in his dissent,

In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.

And it also applies to HOA private governments, because it’s an equitable protection.  We all know that HOA boards have, in all too many instances, grossly dirty unclean hands.  We see the anarchy with 50 different state laws and the 324,000, more or less, independent CC&Rs “constitutions.”

 

Note

[1] Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  This case involved federal wiretapping, which back in 1928, the SC found no violation of the Constitution.