Tag: state agencies

Why aren’t HOAs held as state actors based on USSC criteria?

Allow me to congratulate Deborah Goonan on her fine article, “USSC rules in favor of property rights — how will this affect HOAs?”[1], on constitutionality as applied to HOA-Land.  I also congratulate her for venturing in into the long standing, highly controversial and muddied waters of state actor legal doctrine.

State actor doctrine is too deep and complex to be fully addressed in a blog. I have followed this is for over 15 years having read most of the cases cited by the USSC.  Consequently, I will state some views that I feel will help her subscribers/readers to better understand a broader picture of this doctrine.

First,  the 2 fairly recent USSC cases, Knick and Manhattan, mentioned in Deborah Goonan’s post well illustrate the loss of homeowner constitutional and fundamental rights resulting from the fact that HOAs are not subject to the Constitution as are all other governmental entities; and that state legislatures have refused to make it so.

Second, the rationale for the public policy lack of vigorous pursuit of state actor doctrine in the case of the well documented and pervasive conduct of HOA boards is a slippery-slope fear factor.  This fear is stated by the USSC in Manhattan as:

Consistent with the text of the Constitution, the state-action doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the individual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty. Expanding the state-action doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries would expand governmental control while restricting individual liberty and private enterprise. We decline to do so in this case.

And so, interfering and applying state action to HOAs appears to be avoided to protect your individual freedoms.  I’m somewhat confused. Are you?  Adopting this state policy with respect to HOAs is highly misguided!

Third, although Goonan quotes the USSC use of 3 requirements for state action, the Court did reference the 2001 Brentwood v. Tennessee Secondary School[2] opinion that contained a summary of the criteria the USSC set for determining state action.  Omitting the obvious “exercising exclusive government functions” that requires no further discussion I listed these state actor criteria:

    1. From the State’s exercise of “coercive power,”
    2. when the State provides “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,”
    3. when a private actor operates as a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents
    4. when it is controlled by an “agency of the State,”
    5. when it has been delegated a public function by the State
    6. when it is “entwined with governmental policies,” or
    7. when government is “entwined in [its] management or control.”

In regard to the institutionalization of HOAs, or as I refer to it, HOA-Land, the above tests 1 – 3, and 5 -6 would provide clear and convincing evidence that the policies of state legislatures, as demonstrated by the enacted pro-HOA laws, have created HOAs as state actors who willingly undertake state actions

Fourth, As you can see, there is plenty of “ammunition” to argue that HOAs are state actors.  By the simple use of the word “may” in the statutes raises the highly controversial question of: Are HOAs state actors? “May” is commonly found as “the board may set the time of the annual meeting,” or “may charge . . . .”  The overlooked impact and consequence of this word is to legalize activities and actions that were all-to-fore not legal rights granted to the HOA.  They are now made a legal activity, if your BOD so chooses.[3]

That’s easily “supportive”, “cooperating,” “encouraging,” and “entwined” in both public policy – more taxes from high value properties – and in the “management and control” of the HOA as we see how state laws mimic the governing documents, thereby legalizing them.

Fifth, HOAs have been described as sui generis – one of a kind.[4]  Sui generis presents a view of HOAs as private government principalities supported by your state legislature and is used to justify special laws for a special organization, the HOA. Existing constitutional law is inadequate to support this model of local governance and so, in violation of US and state constitutions,  we see all those HOA/PUD/condo “Acts” in almost every state.  These Acts constitute a parallel supreme law of the land with sharp contrasts to the US Constitution.

 

Finally, state actor doctrine can be a very powerful tool in the hands of HOA reformers, but the public policy of a feared slippery-slope defense must be overcome. It can be overcome IF advocates make a strong case that this public policy as applied to HOA-Land is misguided; and the failure of the courts to apply state actor doctrine harms the people living in HOAs.

In the name of justice, a serious look into this doctrine with regard to HOAs must be undertaken by independent think tank political scientists under the auspices of a Congressional mandate. Like setting up and independent counsel to conduct the investigation into HOA-Land.

 

References

[1] “USSC rules in favor of property rights — how will this affect HOAs?”, Deborah Goonan,  IAC, July 15, 2019. Contains links to the 2 USSC cases.

[2] Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). I have made frequent reference to Brentwood in my Commentaries in HOA Constitutional Government.

[3] “Are HOA state actors created by statutory use of shall/may?,” George K. Staropoli, HOA Constitutional Government (April 2019).

[4] A non-inclusive list: Tyler P. Berding, “The failure of the HOA to protect against obsolescence”; Steven Seigel, attorney who analyzed Twin Rivers NJ decision, Wm & Mary Bill of Rights Jnl 1998.

Supreme Court says corporations cannot be used to evade Constitution

The recent non-HOA decision by the US Supreme Court in DOT v. Assn American Railroads[i] has a direct bearing on the constitutionality of the HOA legal scheme.   This case dealt with the legal status of AMTRAK — is it or is it not a government entity — and was there an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.  While I have argued that HOAs are de facto private governments based on their powers, authority and functions, I now make the argument that as a de jure (according to the law) private corporation, HOAs have been unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers. “[R]ecognizing that the power to fashion legally binding rules is legislative.”[ii]

Implicit delegations of legislative powers are described in The Restatement Servitudes[iii] and numerous state statutes carry implicit delegations of legislative powers.[iv]

With respect to violations of the Constitution, the Supreme Court decision in DOT  held 1) that private parties cannot draft agreements to circumvent the Constitution by declaring that an entity, specifically a corporation, is a private organization, 2) that such a determination is made by the courts based on the corporation’s functions, powers and authority, and 3) that in order for a private entity’s delegation of legislative authority to be constitutional, there must be control, supervision and accountability to the state.

I have presented my case that, in the absence of explicit enabling acts, there is implicit unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private HOAs, particularly in regard to legally binding rules, without accountability.

Read the complete paper at Delegation.

[i] Dept. of Transportation v. Assn American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225 (2015)

[ii] Supra 1, p. 17.

[iii] Restatement Third, Property (Servitudes), Susan F. French, Reporter, p. ix (American Law Institute 2000).

[iv] For a sample of implied rulemaking statutes by state, see:  Arizona: ARS 33-1803(A) and (B) for HOAs; 33-1242(A)(1) for condos. California: Civil Code §§ 4340-4370 (Part 5, Chapter 3, Article 5, Operating Rules). Florida HOAs:  Title XL, § 720 et seq. do not explicitly address rules per se, but speak to enforceable “guidelines” and “standards”; Florida Condos:  Title XL, § 718 et seq. (in particular, § 718.1035, the general statement on “association rules”). Nevada: “NRS 116.31065  Rules.  The rules adopted by an association” (with 5 “musts” imposed on the HOA).

Do state HOA Statutes Establish HOAs as State Actors?

Do state laws coerce homeowners and support HOAs? Are UCIOA and other HOA statutes establishing state actors?

The New Jersey Supreme Court appears to headed for a decision soon on constitutional issues for homeowner rights — the Twin Rivers case. Steven Siegel, whose very important paper on constitutionality and private governments is referenced in Note 1, has also co-authored the Twin Rivers AARP amicus curiae brief for the homeowners.

The US Supreme Court has stated criteria for state actors/actions beyond the antiquated “public functions” test based on the 1946 company town model. In my view, many state statutes easily satisfy one or more of these criteria and clearly establish HOAs as state actors.

 

Our cases have identified a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution. We have, for example, held that a challenged activity may be state action when it results from the State’s exercise of “coercive power,” Blum, 457 U.S., at 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, when the State provides “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,” ibid., or when a private actor operates as a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,” Lugar, supra, at 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have treated a nominally private entity as a state actor when it is controlled by an “agency of the State,” Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230, 231, 77 S.Ct. 806, 1 L.Ed.2d 792 (1957) (per curiam), when it has been delegated a public function by the State, cf., e.g., West v. Atkins, supra, at 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627-628, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), when it is “entwined with governmental policies,” or when government is “entwined in [its] management or control,” Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 301, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966). (See note 1).

I believe that many elements of state laws can be shown to create HOAs state actors. Many phrases in law are simple pro-active statements, such as the words “constitute” or “create”, as in “acceptance of the deed constitutes acceptance of the CC&Rs” or “creates a lien on the property as of the date the assessment is due”. In other phrases we run into the issue of state mandates. For example, the word “shall” in statutes is interpreted to mean “must”, and the word “may” does not constitute a command or order, but a just an option. Therefore, it has been argued, a statute is not a legislative mandate if it contains the word “may” rather than “shall”, as many HOA statutes contain.

But, let’s examine this a little more closely. The state has the right under its police powers to regulate our activities, but it must justify its interference as a legitimate government interest. And the tests for “legitimate government interest” become more severe as the state attempts to take away our fundamental rights. For example, the state restriction on our rights must not be one of convenience for them, but of necessity because the state’s objective could not otherwise be accomplished. I have not seen any such justifications in any state HOA Acts or statutes, not even in the various UCIOAs.

If the law is silent on an issue, the legality of the issue is open for a decision. If the law says “shall” or makes what I referred to as a “simple pro-active statement”, then the answer has been given quite clearly. If the statute says “may not”, then it is also quite clear. Now, if it says “may”, isn’t this a legalization of the act and a permission for a person to act in such a manner? While it is not the same as a mandate by the state, isn’t it a legalization of the act? And as such, isn’t the state “sanctioning” the act, which can be viewed as state support for the action, such as fining a homeowner without providing proper due process protections by independent tribunals? Otherwise, if the state disapproved or did not support the action, the statute would have read “may not”. But, it said. “may”.

I argue that all these “mays” are a clear indication of state support, encouragement and coercion in favor of HOAs that deny homeowners their fundamental rights, and make HOAs state actors.

1. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 296 (2001). (See generally, Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty years After Marsh v. Alabama, Wm & Mary Bill of Rights J., Vol. 6, Issue 2 (1998)).