Are HOA state actors created by statutory use of shall/may?

The use of the words “shall” and “may” have generally accepted meanings in state laws and statutes.[1]  Their use in bills and laws relating to HOA-Land raises the highly controversial question of: Are HOAs state actors?  Wayne Hyatt — former CAI president – wrote in 1976 that HOAs were mini-governments.[2]  In general, a state actor is an entity that is functioning as “an arm of the state” or “in place of the state.”[3]  Does the use of “shall” that is defined as “mandatory” make the HOA an arm of the state?

In sum, the US Supreme Court criteria for classification of a state actor can be found in Brentwood:[4]

  1.  From the State’s exercise of “coercive power,”
  2. when the State provides “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,”
  3. when a private actor operates as a “willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents
  4. when it is controlled by an “agency of the State,”
  5. when it has been delegated a public function by the State
  6. when it is “entwined with governmental policies,” or
  7. when government is “entwined in [its] management or control.”

In regard to the institutionalization of HOAs, or as I refer to it, HOA-Land, the above tests 1 – 3, and 5 -6 would provide clear and convincing evidence that the policies of state legislatures, as demonstrated by the enacted pro-HOA laws, have created HOAs as state actors who willingly undertake state actions.  Review your state laws for the use of “shall” and the consequences of that mandate on your individual property rights.

***

The pro-HOA laws enacted by state legislators, aside from other constitutional concerns with respect to the 14th Amendment protections of the equal protection of the law and valid due process, use “may” and “shall” that are permissive and mandatory obligations upon HOAs (and condos).  “May” is commonly found as “the board may set the time of the annual meeting,” or “may charge . . .”  The overlooked impact and consequence of this word is to legalize activities and actions that were all-to-fore not legal rights granted to the HOA.

They are now made a legal activity, if your BOD so chooses.   Prior to a statute using “may” the action or activity had to be granted by the governing documents.  If so, by including it in a statute lends “officialness” to the action, and a very difficult process to declare the statute invalid.  It protects the governing documents if so permitted.

The right granted by the use of “may” to HOA boards (BOD) to fine or monetarily penalize members and filing a lien with the right to foreclose, for example, makes it a legal action not granted to other nonprofit organizations.  Can you imagine PBS or United Fund placing a lien on your failure to not pay your pledge to support their existence? No way!  Why allow HOAs this legal right?  Which of the above criteria does it violate?

***

Now the heart of the matter focuses on the use of “shall” that is a mandatory order to the HOA to act on behalf of the state —  fine those members and collect costs including attorney fees, etc. Not only is it a legal requirement for the HOA to act as ordered, the BOD has no choice, no discretion to do otherwise, nor can the members reject a potential amendment or rule change. So much for democracy at work in HOA-Land!  Which of the above SC criteria does it violate?

It is well beyond the time for those public interest nonprofits touting their support for the Constitution and democratic values to get involved and stop this disgraceful and unconscionable legislation.  Stop the legislation that coerces, encourages, and supports private government, authoritarian HOAs.  Legislation that advances the view that the HOA “constitution” is a better deal than the 232-year-old US Constitution.  Shameful!

***

The American experiment in democracy, as the youthful America was described by Alexis de Tocqueville[5], is being subverted by the HOA legal scheme supported by elected officials and academics parading as the nouveau Philosopher-Kings preaching to the elected government leadership.  In 2009 I commented:

“I explore this failure of the American Experiment and the rise of independent HOA principalities in Establishing the New America of independent HOA principalities (see New America).”

Notes

[1] See “Legislative shall,” paper with quotes from Yale Law Journal and the Arizona bill drafting manual as a specific example.

[2] Read his 1976 statement in To be or not to be a mini or quasi government? Hyatt said ‘yes’. (2015). Wayne Hyatt was a prominent figure in the promotion of HOA-Land as well as an important person in creating CAI in 1973, serving as its second president. I believe he had strong influence in drafting the Del Webb Declarations still in use today.

[3] In general. see arguments for state actors: HOA Case History: state actors or mini/quasi government (2011); Do state HOA Statutes Establish HOAs as State Actors? (2012); Judicial error regarding HOAs as mini-governments and state actors (2015), “This commentary, somewhat technical at times, demonstrates the failure of the courts to address the fundamental issues that HOAs are mini-governments, and that by the collective functions and actions of HOAs there is clear and convincing evidence to make the case that they are indeed state actors. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”

[4] Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).

[5] Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville (Vol. 1, 1832; Vol. 2 1840). Printed by Alfred A. Knopf (1972).

We don’t want no stinkin’ government protection for HOA members

This California Adams-Davis-Stirling newsletter (“California’s Leader in Community Associations Law”) says it all.  Speaking to a new federal law as of October 2016 (that applies to all states), Code of Fed. Reg. §100.7(a)(1)(iii)),

  1. “The law requires that boards take prompt steps to investigate and end harassment.
  2. This intrusion by the federal government into the affairs of homeowners associations is unprecedented.
  3. The burden the new regulations create will likely outweigh any intended benefits regulators had in mind.
  4. Associations are not cities with paid city council members, police forces, and governmental immunities.
  5. Making boards an arm of the federal government is going to make it harder to recruit and keep volunteers on boards.”

 

Items (1) and (5) make the HOA a state actor due to the mandatory “order” to investigate harassment complaints relating to Fair Housing laws. Item 5 deals with one of the fundamental flaws of the HOA legal scheme — unpaid and untrained volunteers with no local government experience to run HOAs.  What would you expect?  You get what you paid for.  That’s a gold mine for HOA attorneys, who have created these pro-HOA state laws and adhesion contract CC&Rs.

Item (4), while HOA boards have no government immunities they hide behind the business judgment rule that says let the board decide, not the courts, in effect giving immunities.

The author, Adrian Adams, recommends that “Boards should work with legal counsel to adopt anti-harassment rules for their associations.”  “Should” is not “shall” and not mandatory.  It is an “ought to” that requires no compliance and carries no enforcement actions.

The HOA attorneys do not want government interference since it really would interfere with their domination of HOA boards: Seek advice from the people who know best, your HOA attorney.  It is a self-serving recommendation to generate more income for the attorneys, who have repeatedly failed to serve the beneficial interests of the HOA membership.

“We don’t want no stinkin’ government protection for HOA members”!  If not, who then?  You can’t have your cake and eat it!

Since the state legislators have failed to act, it becomes necessary for the Feds to protect the people. See The FEDS must restore law and order in secessionist HOA governments and Getting the Feds involved in HOA reforms.

Judicial error regarding HOAs as mini-governments and state actors

Two cases directly dealing with HOAs as mini or quasi governments by means of state actions tests have come to my attention: Brock v. Watergate and Westphal v. Lake Lotawana.[1] (The question of an HOA being a state actor is not raised, but that a specific act of the HOA is a state action. The questions are fundamentally different.) The decisions were based on the public functions (company town) test and one of the US Supreme Court criteria, the “close nexus” test.[2]

Here the question of an HOA being a municipality is linked to showing a comparison with company towns (established by corporations to provide housing for their employees) under the public functions test, which was held to be a municipality. The Court then makes the giant leap to hold that since the HOA was not a company town, and therefore not a municipality, none of its actions can be considered a state action. The Court’s illogical conclusion is that no act of a private entity can be considered a state action, because the entity is not a municipality! This attitude makes a mockery of state action/actors laws that protect citizens from quasi-governments. (Think about this after reading the excerpt below.)

The 1987 Florida Brock opinion, just 4 years after the court quoted Wayne Hyatt’s opposing view in Cohen Hill (see note 2), held that:

A homeowner’s association lacks the municipal character of a company town. In the case of an association, the homeowners own their property and hold title to the common areas pro rata. Moreover, the services provided by a homeowners association, unlike those provided in a company town, are merely a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, those provided by local government. As such, it cannot be said that the homeowners association in this case acts in a sufficiently public manner so as to subject its activities to a state action analysis. Moreover, the association’s maintenance, assessment, and collection activities are not sufficiently connected to the State to warrant a finding of state action. The state cannot be implicated in the association’s activities solely because the association is subject to State law. We conclude that the association in this case does not stand in the position.

(The Court did not realize that most HOA common areas and facilities are not owned by the members, but by the HOA corporation. The members are third-party beneficiaries. The second sentence above is not accurate.)

In further shocking dicta (unsupported legal authority for statements) in the above quote (see To Be in note 2), the Court declared that HOA services are merely a supplement to local government and that as a supplement its acts are insufficiently municipal in nature. Say what?

Well, I got news for the Court. Applying the “common meaning of the word doctrine” shows that “to supplement” means “to complete, add to, or extend by a supplement” and a “supplement” means “something added to complete a thing, supply a deficiency, or reinforce or extend a whole.”  With this definition the HOA would be a part of local government to complete it or supply a deficiency.  The HOA is a municipality!

Sadly, the narrow focus on individual and separate acts and actions to determine the involvement of the state in the functions and activities of the HOA is misguided.  Rather, it is the collection of the numerous acts of the HOA that should be used to determine whether or not the HOA is an arm of the state and stands in place of the state.  Consider for example, does local government supplement state government?  Does town local government stand in the place of state government?

However, based on the irrational argument used in Brock, as quoted above, the Court ruled that the HOA “does not stand in the position of a government.”

 

In the 2003 Missouri Lake Lotawana opinion, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling, asking for a declaratory judgment, using the irrational opinion in Brock and held that the plaintiff’s allegations “require state action, and that, here, there is no state action because the Association is not a state agent. . . . the trial court is effectively saying that Mr. Westphal can have no claim because the Association is not a state actor.”

On the other issues the plaintiff directly alleged state action, arguing that,

[T]hat the Association’s conduct is state action because the Association is a quasi-governmental entity.  He maintains that the Association ‘operates as a ‘mini-government’ because it raises money through dues, has an elected governing body, enacts rules and regulations, and enforces such rules through the court system. In support of this argument, Mr. Westphal relies on [Chesus and Terre du Lac].[3]

Referring to the two cases, the Court concluded,

While both cases discuss how a homeowner’s association operates as a “quasi-governmental entity,” neither is authority for the concept that an association’s “quasi-governmental” actions are state actions. Mr. Westphal fails to cite any authority to support his argument that the action of a quasi-governmental entity is state action.

First, the Court selectively only used the term “quasi” and ignored “mini” as in stated Chesus. “Mini,” of course, speaks of a small municipality, yet a municipality. Both cases simply, without further ado, quote the same Wayne Hyatt statements as I quoted in To Be (see note 2) that contain both words.

And the Court is technically correct with regard to a lack of a court finding, but taking such a view makes a mockery of the law and is highly illogical. As argued since “quasi” means “like,” then any action of a quasi-government must be, a quasi-state action. The degree of “quasi” must extend to state actions, too. Stop the “word games”!

“Quasi” must be defined, but not in terms of the public functions test or private entity devise. It must be defined in accordance with our constitutional system of government that cannot allow for outlaw governments to stand alongside constitutional local government.

This commentary, somewhat technical at times, demonstrates the failure of the courts to address the fundamental issues that HOAs are mini-governments, and that by the collective functions and actions of HOAs there is clear and convincing evidence to make the case that they are indeed state actors. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

(As a reminder, I am not a lawyer and I simply offer my views on HOA-Land.)

Notes

[1] Brock v. Watergate, 502 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 4 Dist. App. (1987); Westphal v. Lake Lotawana, 95 S.W.3d 144 (Mo. App. 2003).

[2] See in general, To be or not to be a mini or quasi government? Hyatt said ‘yes’; Do state HOA Statutes Establish HOAs as State Actors?

[3] Chesus v. Watts, 967 S.W.2d 97 (MO. APP. 1998);  Terre du Lac Assn v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206 (MO. App. 1987)

Supreme Court says corporations cannot be used to evade Constitution

The recent non-HOA decision by the US Supreme Court in DOT v. Assn American Railroads[i] has a direct bearing on the constitutionality of the HOA legal scheme.   This case dealt with the legal status of AMTRAK — is it or is it not a government entity — and was there an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.  While I have argued that HOAs are de facto private governments based on their powers, authority and functions, I now make the argument that as a de jure (according to the law) private corporation, HOAs have been unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers. “[R]ecognizing that the power to fashion legally binding rules is legislative.”[ii]

Implicit delegations of legislative powers are described in The Restatement Servitudes[iii] and numerous state statutes carry implicit delegations of legislative powers.[iv]

With respect to violations of the Constitution, the Supreme Court decision in DOT  held 1) that private parties cannot draft agreements to circumvent the Constitution by declaring that an entity, specifically a corporation, is a private organization, 2) that such a determination is made by the courts based on the corporation’s functions, powers and authority, and 3) that in order for a private entity’s delegation of legislative authority to be constitutional, there must be control, supervision and accountability to the state.

I have presented my case that, in the absence of explicit enabling acts, there is implicit unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private HOAs, particularly in regard to legally binding rules, without accountability.

Read the complete paper at Delegation.

[i] Dept. of Transportation v. Assn American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225 (2015)

[ii] Supra 1, p. 17.

[iii] Restatement Third, Property (Servitudes), Susan F. French, Reporter, p. ix (American Law Institute 2000).

[iv] For a sample of implied rulemaking statutes by state, see:  Arizona: ARS 33-1803(A) and (B) for HOAs; 33-1242(A)(1) for condos. California: Civil Code §§ 4340-4370 (Part 5, Chapter 3, Article 5, Operating Rules). Florida HOAs:  Title XL, § 720 et seq. do not explicitly address rules per se, but speak to enforceable “guidelines” and “standards”; Florida Condos:  Title XL, § 718 et seq. (in particular, § 718.1035, the general statement on “association rules”). Nevada: “NRS 116.31065  Rules.  The rules adopted by an association” (with 5 “musts” imposed on the HOA).

Unconstitutional delegation of power to HOAs

Article I. Section 1, of the US Constitution states that “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” and nowhere in the Constitution is there any mention that Congress can delegate its exclusive law making powers to any other branch of the government or to any other organization.  State constitutions have similar wordings like that of Arizona, “The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of a  . . . .” 

The legislative authority and powers of the state are past down to subdivisions of the state known as cities, towns, counties, taxing districts, etc.  These powers are said to be delegated from above to the subdivision, and it is common sense that if an entity does not have the power then it cannot delegate that power to anyone else.

This delegation of authority is carried out through a state’s municipal corporation and county laws (and to executive agencies by means of enabling acts of authority).  Reading the municipality laws reveals authority for a defined territory, large or small and often referred to as a community, to elect a governing body, establish courts, make laws and ordinances (rules and regulations), enforce laws, have courts, have a police department, establish fines for violations, have a jail, and to assess residents and collect taxes.  All under the approval and oversight of the state legislature.  These subdivisions are also known as state entities, public bodies or arms of the state.

We must first, once again, decide if HOAs are state actors and arms of the state like any other municipality, or are they just private nonprofit corporations. If found to be a state actor, the 14th Amendment applies and no further investigation into the constitutionality the delegation of legislative authority is necessary.

HOAs as state actors

Let’s start anew and compare state constitutions and city/town charters with the duties, powers and functions of the homeowners association governing body widely set forth in its declaration of conditions, covenants and restrictions (CC&Rs). The CC&Rs declares and defines the authority for the HOA to act in certain manners. We can easily see almost identical powers and duties with municipal corporations, far more so than can be found in a business charter, as CAI like to argue, or in a nonprofit charitable organization, or in a professional association, or in a trade association, or in a union charter, or in a for profit property management service business.

Seeking, attaching and using special meanings to common everyday words and concepts to fit a square peg in a round hole, as the pro-HOAs forces have made an art form, flies in the face of reality.  CAI likes to argue that assessments are not like taxes, that fines are not penalties for violations, rules and regs are not ordinances, etc. Dismissing these special definitions, HOA CC&Rs are almost identical to municipal charters of authority, which becomes quite apparent when we strip away these contrived definitions of words and look and the total picture that reveals the entire intent of the CC&Rs.  And that’s to govern the subdivision or community, to regulate and control the people within the subdivision.

In effect, HOAs are de facto political governments.  I choose the description of HOAs as a political entity and not a quasi or mini-government, because it more accurately describes the nature of the governing body – ruling over people in their homes. As I recently wrote,

The policy makers fail to understand that the terms and conditions of the HOA CC&Rs cross over the line between purely property restrictions to establishing unregulated and authoritarian private governments.[1]

The argument has been made that HOA governments are equivalent to municipalities with respect to powers, duties and authority and as such are indeed state actors subject to the 14th Amendment’s restrictions.

 

Unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to HOAs

We must now address the argument that HOAs are not state actors, but private actors or entities not subject to the 14th Amendment.  We need to determine the legitimacy and constitutionality of these private actors, these private corporations formed under a private agreement. This takes us back to the question raised in the beginning of this paper of the constitutional delegation of legislative authority and powers not to agencies, but to private entities.

(The case where it is believed that there was no delegation to HOAs at all will be addressed below.)

This question of delegating legislative powers, or the non-delegation doctrine, has, like constitutional questions, undergone multiple court opinions resulting in a complex web of: what is the law?  To make things short, my layman’s summary comes down to deference to private entities, because they know better about their business or corporation than does the court.  And if the owners have elected a governing body, then that body speaks for the owners. A prime example of this judicial philosophy that should be familiar to most homeowners is the business judgment rule. The board knows best, unless it can be shown that it has acted unreasonably.

Sadly, the courts have shown less and less concern for constitutional intent and values or in protecting individual rights in favor of a money oriented practicality of efficiency of government — one that favors the privatization of legislative authority.  Yes, I know, confusing and unbelievable, but remember the quote from the Forward in The Restatement,Therefore this Restatement is enabling toward private government.”[2]  Private actors (unlike the executive branch) have virtually no public accountability, and legislatures may be too busy to address their misdeeds by repealing legislation. Checks and balances and government oversight are of little concern as we are quite familiar with their absence in HOA state laws.

I can hear CAI shouting, way over here, that there is no delegation of legislative powers to private HOAs!  Precisely! There are no enabling acts granting HOAs such legislative powers. That makes CC&Rs and HOAs an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority.  If municipal corporations, agencies and private entities must have delegated authority to act, no matter how broad or detrimental to individual rights, then how can HOAs not be outside our constitutional system of government?  Even a state’s most liberal adoption of the home rule doctrine requires allegiance to the state and US constitutions. (See HOAs violate local home rule doctrine and are outlaw governments).

Our government cannot look aside and ignore this assault on the foundations of our system of government!  We cannot tolerate everything goes, especially self-anointed political governments.

In defense of this unacceptable attitude by elected officials, it can be argued that even though there may not be explicit delegation there is an implied delegation of legislative powers, based on the nature and intent of the state’s HOA acts and statutes. These state laws permit those functions and powers of a municipal government, as stated in above, that regulate and control the peoples within a subdivision, large or small.

(Some states do have a statement of general government interest to overcome any judicial scrutiny as to constitutionality under the 14th Amendment, which can be challenged. The basis is that the statutes also contain serious harm to others.  In Shelly, “the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand”[3] and that constitutional rights were denied.)

US Supreme Court to address delegation to private entities

The question of the delegation of legislative powers to private entities is now before the US Supreme Court in DOT v. Association of American Railroads.[4]   Stephen Wermiel writes that “The Solicitor General argues that there is no unconstitutional delegation to a private entity because government officials retained control . . .[5]   We know this is not true with HOA statutes.

Wermiel continues,

The Supreme Court must decide if the delegation of authority to Amtrak is an unconstitutional grant of legislative powers to a private entity. To reach that decision, the Justices must decide if the authority given to Amtrak by federal law is legislative in nature, and whether Amtrak is a private corporation or a public entity.[6]

Either way, whether HOAs are de facto political governments and state entities, or are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers, they can only legally function as an arm of the state under the restrictions of the 14th Amendment.

References and authorities

[1] See CC&Rs are a devise for de facto HOA governments to escape constitutional government.

[2] Restatement Third, Property: Servitudes (American Law Institute 2000).  The full statement reads, from the Forward: “Professor Susan French [Reporter (chief editor/contributor) for this Restatement] begins with the assumption . . . that we are willing to pay for private government because we believe it is more efficient than [public] government  . . . . Therefore this Restatement is enabling toward private government, so long as there is full disclosure . . . .”

[3] Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

[4] DOT v. Association of American Railroads, No. 12-1080 (SCOTUS).

[5] Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Non-delegation doctrine returns after long hiatus.  (SCOTUSblog Dec. 4, 2014)

[6] Id.