Tag: Randy Barnett

AZ SC in Kalway holds CC&Rs as “special contracts”

Author’s note:  I make extensive use of direct quotes in order to avoid my interpretations “leaking” through.

The Arizona Supreme Court in Kalway[i] threw some light on the controversy that HOA covenants and CC&Rs are valid contracts and are held as such.   The Court held that, my emphasis,

“CC&Rs form a contract between individual landowners and all the landowners bound by the restrictions, as a whole. . . . in special types of contracts, we do not enforce ‘unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation . . . . CC&Rs are such contracts.  Because covenants originate in contract, the primary purpose of a court when interpreting a covenant is to give effect to the original intent of the parties’ with any doubts resolved against the validity of a restriction.”

With respect to the requirement for very important but ignored homeowner notice, the Court continued, my emphasis,

“The notice requirement relies on a homeowner’s reasonable expectations based on the declaration in effect at the time of purchase—in this case, the original declaration.  Under general contract law principles, a majority could impose any new restrictions on the minority because the original declaration provided for amendments by majority vote. But allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed. . . . Thus, “[t]he law will not subject a minority of landowners to unlimited and unexpected restrictions on the use of their land merely because the covenant agreement permitted a majority to make changes to existing covenants.”

One of the most egregious injustices that I’ve come across is the failure of the courts to apply the full body of contract law to HOA covenants in CC&Rs.  Opinions and dicta refer to the CC&Rs simply as a contract, or an agreement interpreted as a contract — yet in spite of the above opinion — fail to protect the homeowner under contract law 101.  The Cornell Legal Information Institute lists the basic criteria for a valid contract:

 ‘The basic elements required for the agreement to be a legally enforceable contract are: mutual assent, expressed by a valid offer and acceptance; adequate consideration; capacity; and legality.”

Added to this general description of a legal contract is the Opinion holding that the CC&Rs are special contracts that do not permit “unreasonable  expectations” and that the notice of reasonable expectations is set forth in the CC&Rs “at the time of purchase,” and the law will protect minority owners from any such expectations.   

As I have argued many times,[ii] the boilerplate  amendment process that binds non-agreeing owners solely on the basis of a majority or some super majority renders the original “contract” a meaningless piece of paper. 

Professor Barnett explains,

“A law may be ‘valid’ because it was produced in accordance with all the procedures required by a particular lawmaking system, [the HOA amendment procedure, for example] but be ‘illegitimate’ because these procedures were inadequate to provide assurances that a law is just.”[iii]

Conclusion

It should be evident to all that this constitutional issue of “signed the agreement” and are thereby bound to obey needs further thought. As it stands, homeowners in HOAs are subject to special laws, the numerous state HOA/Condo Acts, for special entities allowed to function as de facto private governments outside the protections of the US Constitution.

Notes

[i] Kalway v. Calbria Ranch, CV-20-o152-PR, ¶ 13 -16  (Ariz. March 22, 2022).

[ii] See HOA consent to agree vs. “the will of the majority”,  Contracts, the Constitution and consent to be governed and HOA Common Sense, No. 4: Consent to be governed.

[iii] Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Princeton Univ. Press, (2004).

Can HOA members expect justice in Arizona courts?

“HOA members in Arizona should not expect justice from the courts”

If you are a member of an Arizona HOA/condo, or soon plan to be one, you should pay heed to the above quote made in response to the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial to hear the Bendt appeal petition for review.[i]  In my Commentary, trying to understand the rationale for the denial,

“The homeowner, Bendt, is punished for speaking out, in admittedly harsh terms, [relating to issues of HOA governance]. Yet the judicial system stands by looking at a distance and allowing Trump and his followers to function as vexatious litigants; allowing them to  raise allegations, which are not only laughable but blatantly false under Rule 11, is shameful conduct.”[ii]

What message is being sent by this disturbing decision? To the public? To the homeowners in HOAs seeking the equal protection of the laws under the Constitution? To the national lobbying trade group, CAI, who can breathe easy with respect to any challenges to the constitutionality of the HOA legal scheme that  contains denials of fundamental rights and privileges?

Professor Randy Barnett wrote, speaking of justice and judicial legitimacy,

“A constitution that lacks adequate procedures to ensure the justice of valid laws is illegitimate even if it was consented to by a majority …. A law may be ‘valid’ because it was produced in accordance with all the procedures required by a particular lawmaking system, [the HOA amendment procedure, for example] but be ‘illegitimate’ because these procedures were inadequate to provide assurances that a law is just.”[iii]  

And we must not ignore the effect of precedent on court opinions. Hansford and Spriggs found [that] the doctrine of stare decisis, itself, falls victim to the preferences of the judges. The closer the precedent was to the judges views, the more the precedent would be followed, and vice versa. Additionally, the research found that “the justices are more likely to negatively treat [modify or reject] a precedent they dislike on ideological grounds if that precedent is quite vital [how often cited in support]” by the judges (p. 75).[iv]  Bad HOA laws abound leading to favorable anti-homeowner decisions.

And still we see “Equal justice under the law” emblazoned on the façade of the US Supreme Court building. It contains a major defect, a misleading fallacy,  and a presumption of supreme court infallibility [without error].  Bad laws — unjust laws — will not produce justice for all!  And that is just what we face in the HOA-Land Nation.

I have argued (2009) for a judicial system that adhere to the following:

“Before we can decide, we must examine some of the myths and realities of the American judicial system.  First, we have the concept of justice, the very foundation of any judicial system, although some have argued it is to uphold the law.  Philosophically, a judicial system cannot exist in a democracy if it does not uphold justice and correct the wrongs of the past.  In fact the people are told “Equal Justice Under Law”, the motto on the Supreme Court building; “to secure justice”, the commonplace stated purpose of court rules of procedure;   “to establish justice”, the opening purpose in the Preamble to the US Constitution; and we designate the members of the Supreme Court as “justices”. Notice that “to uphold the law” is not included in the above.  This is the argument, along with the insistence on precedent, used by those special interests who favor unjust laws.”[v]

. . . .

So, in particular, what is wrong with the AZ  supreme court denial in Bendt?  A lot!

An amicus brief is submitted, and subject to approval by the Court and the parties, to advise the Justices in better understanding the conditions and factors relevant its opinion that it may not be aware of. The following is a summary of arguments presented in my amicus brief[vi] seeking the Court to review the petition in the name of justice for the homeowner, Bendt, and for all other citizens living n Arizona HOAs.

“The Hannaman 2002 study (NJ) was quite frank and revealing describing problems and complaint still in existence some 19 years later in spite of efforts by the self-proclaimed HOA experts and educators, national CAI. “

“[Referring to Nevada Supreme Court in Kosor v. Olympia Companies, 478 P.3d 390 (2020)]. Because we conclude that each of Kosor’s statements was “made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum,” we reverse the district court’s decision to the contrary and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

“As our [California] Supreme Court has recognized, owners of planned development units ” ‘comprise a little democratic subsociety . . . .’ ” (citations omitted).” (Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Ct. App. 2000) at “A. Public Forum”).

“Among its findings [South Carolina HOA study committee] were . . . While the Community Association Institute (CAI) and other private entities offer educational resources to homeowners and managers, state government cannot place the sole responsibility of educating homeowners and board members on a private entity.

“Although not presented by the Appellant where three plaintiffs who] are lawyers, and based on claims of false and inexcusable character assassination against Tarter . . . this Court has reasonable suspicion to remand the case for a determination the validity of an anti-slapp motion.

“This Court, or any court, cannot allow a group of individuals or organizations to create a devise in order to escape constitutional protections and enter into a contract, constitutionally valid in all other aspects, to form private local governments whose members remain citizens of this country as well as of their respective states. It, as it stands in regard to HOAs, makes a mockery of the Constitution and our principles of a democratic society.

“The free speech issues of limited-purpose public figure and of HOAs and social media as public forums with respect to political HOA governance issues have been raised and need to be addressed.

“As with Brown [v. Bd of Educ.], America’s culture and environment has changed dramatically from 1964’s Homes Association Handbook and the formation in 1973 of Community Associations Institute (CAI) to deal with rising HOA problems and constitutional concerns after only 9 years. In 1992 CAI dropped its 501(c)3 educational status for 501(c)6 trade organization so it could lobby state legislators.”

I cannot understand the Supreme Court’s denial of Bendt’s petition and the opportunity to rule or to further investigate these issues, by orders or by request to the Legislature — as it has so ordered in the past —  and thereby fulfilling its obligation to defend the Arizona and US Constitutions.  Instead, it seems that the Justices have allowed their opinions to be guided by the prevailing public policy favoring private government HOAs that are independent of the two Constitutions.[vii]

References

[i] See AZ supreme court denies hearing HOA case raising limited-purpose public figure doctrine.

[ii] Id.

[iii] Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Princeton Univ. Press, (2004).

[iv] Hansford and Spriggs, The Politics of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court, Princeton Univ. Press (2006).

[v] See in general,  HOAs, justice, and judicial myth and precedent.

[vi] Staropoli Amicus brief Tarter  v. Bendt

[vii] See in general, The HOA-Land Nation Within America and Establishing the New America of Independent HOA Principalities.

Desert Mountain opinion (AZ) constitutionality – part 2

Introduction

This 2-part Commentary on the H-O-A amendment boilerplate process entails a number of complex constitutional issues that are interlinked.  Discussing one results in discussing another, etc. in order to fully understand the validity of the H-O-A legal scheme.  [quote — ]You can’t see the forest for the trees[  –unquote  ] is the result of this complexity obfuscated by the Restatement and by the national pro-H-O-A special interest lobbyists.

In Part 1 I discussed 5 selected views by the appellate court that I see as constitutional challenges.   Herein Part 2 I present constitutionality challenges in regard to 1)  the bias found in the  Restatement of Servitudes,[1] a legal authority on court decisions and common law in favor of the H-O-A legal scheme, and 2) the freedom to contract doctrine[2] and its bearing on whether people are truly free to enter an H-O-A private government contract.

The Arizona appellate court ruling in Nicdon v. Desert Mountain[3] with respect to a CC&Rs amendment needs to be appealed to the AZ supreme court. In Part 1,  I raised the question of an on color of law denial of fundamental rights to property; on violations of the equal protection of the laws.   

Disclaimer: Understanding that in spite of my 20+ years reading hundreds of federal and state supreme court and appellate court opinions, I am not a lawyer nor am I employed by a lawyer; I only offer my views.

. . . .

Restatement of Property: Servitudes

In Item 5 of Part 1, I raised my concern that the Court relied on the Restatement of Servitudes quoting, [quote — ]A restrictive covenant is generally valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy[  –unquote  ].[4]  The Restatement (American Law Institute) is accepted as legal authority even though it seems to be advancing ought to be or societal goals rather than reporting the law and factual court decisions.  

[quote — ]The Institute’s mission is [quote — ]to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.[  –unquote  ] It achieves this goal through the development of Institute projects, which are categorized as Restatements, Codes, or Principles. . . . Restatements are primarily addressed to courts and aim at clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements, and reflect the law as it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a court.[  –unquote  ][5]

The opening sentence above is the heart of the problem.  It presumes that justice is accomplished through ALI’s promotion of current court decisions, which in turn, are the reflection of a bias as  to what constitutes [quote — ]a better adaption to social needs.[  –unquote  ]  It flies in the face of  long standing constitutional doctrine on the legitimacy of the law and the consent of the governed.   It opens up to the controversy regarding the extent to which people may associate and establish contracts under freedom to and freedom of contract.

This 2000 update and marked rewrite began in 1987, 13 years ago. It is now another 21 years of substantive changes in the laws and public policy; H-O-As have now been institutionalized and accepted as [quote — ]this is he way it is.[  –unquote  ]  This is quite clear from the Forward (emphasis added):

 [quote — ]Professor Susan French [Reporter (chief editor/contributor) for this Restatement] begins with the assumption . . . that we are willing to pay for private government because we believe it is more efficient than [public] government  . . . . Therefore this Restatement is enabling toward private government, so long as there is full disclosure . . . .[  –unquote  ]

And we know there is an absence of full disclosure that amounts to misrepresentation.  Sadly, there is evidence of contradictory statements aiding and abetting this misrepresentation even in the Restatement that is used as legal authority by the courts. While the Court quoted comment a of §3.1[6] (see [quote — ]Contractual freedoms[  –unquote  ] below), it omitted comment h, which reads, [quote — ]in the event of a conflict between servitudes law and the law applicable to the association form [its private contractual nature], servitudes law should control.[  –unquote  ]

In addition, while the court referenced §6.10 it unbelievably failed to reject §6.13, comment a, which states: [quote — ]The question whether a servitude unreasonably burdens a fundamental constitutional right is determined as a matter of property law, and not constitutional law.[  –unquote  ]

Need I say more about securing the [quote — ]better administration of justice[  –unquote  ]?  Certainly not for the affected people — the H-O-A homeowners.  ALI is guilty of bias against the homeowners, the [quote — ]patients,[  –unquote  ] as analogous to the medical profession with its high degree of specialization where, working on the same body, the left hand doesn’t know about, or doesn’t care about, what the right hand is doing at the same time. 

If it is true and believable that laws are to provide justice, as widely proclaimed, the courts and the lawmakers must consider the effects of both hands on the patient. ALI must adjust its approach and remove these pro-H-O-A views and make references to applicable constitutional law.  ALI must also recognize that H-O-As are another form of local government that is not subject to the Constitution, and remove §6.13, comment a. 

The policy makers have failed to understand that the H-O-A CC&Rs have crossed over the line between purely property restrictions to establishing unregulated and authoritarian private governments.

Section 6 of the Restatement, Part D, Governance of Common – Interest Communities, attempts to deal with the governance of H-O-As in general. Section 6.16 addresses representative government.  It does not read at all like the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights.

Contractual freedoms and consent to be bound

Let’s begin with the excerpt from Desert Mountain opinion  in Part 1(1) linking the binding of the CC&Rs [quote — ]contract[  –unquote  ] by deed acceptance to the implicit consent to be bound in a single quote (emphasis added),

[quote — ]By accepting a deed in the Desert Mountain planned community, the [homeowner]  became bound by the Declaration, including properly adopted amendments. . . . when [a] homeowner takes [a] deed containing restriction allowing amendment by majority vote, homeowner implicitly consents to any subsequent majority vote to modify or extinguish deed restrictions[  –unquote  ].

By this doctrine, contract law 101 is ignored in favor of servitude law, as the Restatement advises  and an implicit waiver and surrender of a fundamental property right is accepted as valid, thereby treating the homeowner as a second-class citizen.  It does not do justice for the homeowner and should be held as an illegitimate exercise of police power by the legislature.

 In Item 5 of Part 1, I also raised the matter of the freedom to contract doctrine as contained in comment (a) of  the Restatement’s §3.1  that I now discuss in some detail here due to its constitutional complexity.

‘‘In general, parties may contract as they wish [freedom to contract] , and the courts will enforce their agreements without passing on the substance . . . The principle of freedom of contract is rooted in the notion that it is in the public interest to recognize that individuals have broad powers to order their own lives.’[  –unquote  ]   

In opposition to the above, I raised the following questions  years ago in 2005,

[quote — ]When did ‘whatever the people privately contract’ dominate the protections of the U.S. Constitution?  Please state what, if any, are the government’s interests in supporting H-O-As that deny the people their constitutional rights?[  –unquote  ]

I have not received an answer from any party including constitutional think tanks, state legislators, attorney generals, or the media.  It’s obvious that in any reply they [quote — ]would be defending the indefensible![  –unquote  ]

Freedom to contract; implied consent to be bound

The simplistic argument that remaining in the H-O-A implies consent is answered, in general,  by political scientist, professor of constitutional law, and author Randy Barnett,

Simply remaining in this country, however, is highly ambiguous. It might mean that you consent to be bound by the laws . . . or it might mean that you have a good job and could not find a better one [elsewhere] . . . or that you do not want to leave your loved ones behind. It is simply unwarranted that to conclude from the mere act of remaining . . . that one has consented to all and any of the laws thereof.[  –unquote  ][7]

I broadly address the consent issue in H-O-A Common Sense, No. 4: Consent to be governed[8]  (2008).  A deeper discussion can be found in H-O-A consent to agree vs. [quote — ]the will of the majority[  –unquote  ] (2019) wherein I quote constitutional scholars Randy Barnett, Keith E. Whittingham, and Edwin Meese.[9]

The important, selected, noteworthy quotes shown below bear directly on the defects in the top-down, take it-or leave it CC&Rs:

[quote — ]Tacit consent purports to provide a rationale for obligating those of us, by chance or choice, have not made their approval of the government explicit [Whittingham].[  –unquote  ]

[quote — ]The [quote — ]consent of the governed[  –unquote  ] stands in contrast to [quote — ]the will of the majority[  –unquote  ] . . . consent is the means whereby arbitrary power is thwarted [Meese].[  –unquote  ]

[quote — ]A law may be ‘valid’ because it was produced in accordance with all the procedures required by a particular lawmaking system, [the H-O-A amendment procedure, for example] but be ‘illegitimate’ because these procedures were inadequate to provide assurances that a law is just’ [Barnett].[  –unquote  ]

US Supreme Court must decide

I have informed readers about the  sticky-wicket that ties all these constitutional questions together as applied to the H-O-A legal structure and scheme; a sticky-wicket that must be resolved once and for all by the US Supreme Court.

References

[1] Restatement (3rd), Property: Servitudes, Susan F. French, Reporter, American Law Institute (2000).

[2] The question of  [quote — ]legitimacy of consent[  –unquote  ] is explored by Randy Barnett in his publications where he argues that there are limitations.  Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Randy E. Barnett, Part 1, Princeton University Press, 2004). 

[3] Nicdon v. Desert Mountain, No. 1 CA-CV 20-0129 (April 29, 2021).  

[4] Supra n.1, §3.3(1).

[5] [quote — ]How the Institute Works,[  –unquote  ] American Law Institute (ALI),website (May 3, 2011).

[6] This section of the Restatement, Validity of Servitude Arrangements, speaks to unconstitutional servitudes (§3.1(d)) and servitudes violating public policy (3.1(e)).  Worth reading.

[7] Supra n.3, p.19.

[8] See H-O-A Common Sense: rejecting private government (2008) pamphlet on Amazon.

[9] Barnett, supra n. 3; Whittingham, [quote — ]Chapter 5, Popular Sovereignty and Originalism,[  –unquote  ] Constitutional Interpretation, Univ. Press of Kansas (1999); Meese, [quote — ]What the Constitution Means,[  –unquote  ] The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (2005). Meese was the US Attorney General under Ronald Reagan.

Desert Mountain opinion (AZ) constitutionality part 1

The Arizona appellate court ruling in Nicdon v. Desert Mountain[1] needs to be appealed to the AZ supreme court on color of law denial of fundamental rights to property; on violations of the equal protection of the laws.  While the issue at hand was an amendment to restrict short-term rentals to just 30 days, it raised several constitutional concerns.

It is unfortunate that the Court relied on earlier HOA case law as precedent.  When these older decisions are quoted and cited, they must be reviewed and rebutted along constitutional concerns. 

Disclaimer: Understanding that in spite of my 20+ years reading hundreds of federal and state supreme court and appellate court opinions, I am not a lawyer nor am I employed by a lawyer; I only offer my views.

. . . .

With respect to Desert Mountain, the following are quotes from the opinion  that I find contentious and worthy of constitutional challenges.

1.  “By accepting a deed in the Desert Mountain planned community, Nicdon became bound by the Declaration, including properly adopted amendments. . . . when [a] homeowner takes [a] deed containing restriction allowing amendment by majority vote, homeowner implicitly consents to any subsequent majority vote to modify or extinguish deed restrictions”.

Surprise! Surprise! “Implicit consents”  means not clearly stated. This is a reality hidden from and not made known to the buyer at closing by the builder, the HOA, or the real estate agent, thus raising full disclosure of material facts violations. Meanwhile the courts, and CAI, have repeatedly upheld the validity of the CC&Rs as a bona fide contract against homeowners.

2.  “In addition, in interpreting contracts, “we attempt to reconcile and give effect to all terms . . . to avoid any term being rendered superfluous.”  The Court accepts CC&Rs as a valid contract.  Based on (1) above, this is an unequal protection of the laws and a due process violation resulting from misrepresentation of material facts.

3.  “In adopting the Amendment, Desert Mountain properly followed the procedures laid out in its governing documents.”  Under contract law this can be seen as an invalid “agreement to agree.”   The homeowner raised the issue of an unreasonable addition to the CC&Rs, but the Court saw it differently.  The real argument, in my mind, was the invalid agreement to agree and therefore,  a taking of personal property without compensation not permitted under the federal and Arizona constitutions.

“Although no such restrictions explicitly appeared in the Declaration when Nicdon’s principals purchased their home, they could have reasonably anticipated further restriction or expansion on matters within the scope of the Declaration’s regulation.”

There are no grounds for holding that a member “could have reasonably anticipated further restriction or expansion on matters. . . .”  It’s dictum.  The governing documents are not set up for handling agreements to agree on broad and unreasonable amendments that are NOT negotiated with the members. Voting for the amendment is not negotiating. Many members speaking out on contract matters is not negotiating one-to-one. But, in order to make the HOA work, the amendment process, following public processes, rejects contract validity.  We have unequal protection of the law.

Also, is this an open-ended procedure  making the covenant invalid? “Some courts have concluded that an agreement to negotiate at a later date is an unenforceable agreement to agree. . . . But other courts have distinguished unenforceable agreements to agree from valid agreements to negotiate in good faith.”[2]

4.  “Given these provisions, as well as the comprehensive nature of the Declaration and its amendment procedures, a prospective purchaser of a lot in the community would reasonably be on notice their property would be regulated by extensive use restrictions, including limitations on renting of homes, subject to amendment in accordance with the Section 5.20 process.”

I would argue that a buyer would “reasonably be on notice their property would be regulated by extensive use restrictions” is  an abuse of discretion in that reasonableness is with regard to the content of the amendment and not the notice of an amendment.  It is obvious that there is no provision for negotiations with the homeowner.  The governing documents amendment provisions are set up as if it were a local government and not a one-to-one contract. It needs further explanation.

5.  “A restrictive covenant is generally valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy” was quoted from the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 3.1(1). 

The Court added §3.1(1)),

 “this concept “applies the modern principle of freedom to contract,” which generally means that courts will enforce parties’ agreements “without passing on their substance.”. . . .  A restriction may violate public policy for several reasons, including if the restriction is “arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious.”

I will forego a discussion of freedom to contract[3] and the reliance on the Restatement of Servitudes,[4] which I find biased in its support of HOA and not an independent reporter on common law and court decisions.  Part 2 will go into these complex but highly relevant constitutional issues relating to the HOA legal scheme.

. . . .

What has been lacking in HOA litigation over the years, with all due respect to homeowner champion lawyers, is constitutional law expertise.  I’ve read too many cases that touched upon constitutional arguments like free speech, due process, and equal protection of the laws but failed to delve deeply into these defects in the HOA legal scheme.

  The broad approach successfully used by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her women’s rights litigation needs to be adopted here. And, as usual, CAI was there representing the HOA or by filing amicus curiae briefs.

References

[1]   Nicdon v. Desert Mountain, No. 1 CA-CV 20-0129 (April 29, 2021).

[2] The Lawletter Blog, The National Legal Research Group, (April 30, 2021).

[3] The question of  “freedom to contract” is explored by Randy Barnett where he argues that there are limitations. Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Randy E. Barnett, Princeton University Press, (2004).

[4] Restatement (3rd) Property: Servitudes (American Law Institute 2000).

Homeowner rights advocate Staropoli: Recommended Author

Amazon books/eBooks has a category “Recommended Authors For You.” While in my Amazon Prime page, it appeared on-and-off when I viewed an author in the constitutional law category (Oct. 30, 2020).  I am proud to say that my years of hard work has paid off this month with Amazon recognizing that I’m an author of note in this category.  Apparently it selectively appears depending on your interest history.

I met Randy E. Barnett, the top-right author, and have an autographed copy of his book, Restoring the Lost Constitution. I also appeared on his Amazon author web page (Amazon randomly selects qualified authors for recommendations).