Alleged waiver of rights in HOAs are invalid

I congratulate California Senate Majority Leader Ellen M. Corbett for sponsoring SB 561. This bill asserts California’s rightful authority to impose and restore law and order over this second form of political local governments known as HOAs. This is still America, a land under the rule of law. The disintegration and fragmentation of government and society must be stopped before anarchy reigns, right here in America.

 

The law firm of Swedelson & Gottlieb (S & G) argues on its Blog that they know of no one losing their home just because they waiver their rights to have their payments applied first to assessment reduction rather than to collection costs. There are good, equitable and just reasons for paying down the debt first: paying the costs first prolongs the collection agency income stream, not the HOA’s, as the amount of debt goes on forever and may never decrease. Under these circumstances, like “being under water” in today’s housing market, why pay at all?

 

HOAs are required to apply payments to debt reduction, just like your credit card companies. With a straight face S & G states, We are aware of no homeowners who have ever lost their homes in an association’s foreclosure simply because of unpaid fees and costs of collection.” So, I guess all is well and right with this use of the payment waiver.

 

This attitude, used by other proponents favoring the survival of the HOA and their incomes streams, portrays all members of an HOA as being so enamored with their HOA that they place their well being and financial conditions in the hands of the HOA board. They are portrayed as being true believers seeing no wrong with the HOA, much as one sees with many religious cults. They are portrayed as openly and eagerly waiving their rights in favor of the HOA no matter how disastrous to them. How insulting to all Americans: your obligation to the “state”, the HOA, is to make timely payments, and any rights, freedoms, privileges or immunities are notwithstanding.

 

In its argument for payment plans, created by the HOA’s agent, but “the board dictates the terms of the agreement,” S & G seems to contradict its argument that the “pay costs first” is for the benefit of the HOA, not the collection agency (emphasis added).

 

There is good reason for this– boards know from experience that many homeowners pay the assessment portion of the payment plan agreement but do not pay the costs of collection, knowing full well that the association cannot foreclose for costs of collection only.

 

Say what? The debtors will pay their assessments to the HOA, making the effort for the benefit of the HOA, not the collection agency? Why would a board give up its first claim to $$$ for the benefit of the collection agency? That doesn’t make sense at all, does it? Why are HOA boards allowing their right to first $$$ go to a “hired-hand” vendor, in violation of their duties to the HOA? Why?

 

It makes sense if the whole purpose of S & G’s position is not to benefit the HOA but its own pocketbook. Furthermore, S& G continues to whine about the debt owed to them that the HOA cannot pay since all the money is going to the HOA first. Boo hoo! I guess they know all about “You can’t get blood from a turnip.”

 

Isn’t that a business decision all businesses face? The loss against the cost of collecting? What about contingency collection agency arrangements? Don’t let S & G slip past this point! If they are so good, the HOA should insist on this type of an arrangement rather than the punitive arrangement now commonly used.

 

And when all else fails, we hear the familiar mantra, “But really, is it fair for the paying/current homeowners to have to subsidize delinquent homeowners?” Well, you see, that “contract S & G says binds all homeowners may not be fair to some homeowners, but that’s what the legal structure of an HOA imposes on members. Is it fair not to tell home buyers about this, and about some other waivers and surrenders of rights unbeknownst to them? Take a look at “The Truth in HOAs Disclosure Agreement” for some eye-openers.

 

Cleverly, S & G avoids the question of a violation of public policy, which as stated in the Restatement (3rd) of Property:Servitudes, Sec. 3.1, makes any covenant invalid. The argument against SB 561 is simply: How dare the California Legislature prohibit a homeowner, exercising his write to contract, without any duress, from surrendering his right to the ethical and fair procedure of debt reduction before costs. How dare the legislature!

Calif. opinion: CC&Rs and surrender of constitutional rights

 

This is an important Calif. case on CC&Rs and the extent to which your “agreement” to be bound satisfies the waiver of your constitutional rights.  Arizona’s HB 2441  – written by CAI — proposes a waiver of access to the courts by homeowners.  CAI wants it in law rather than by contract to avoid a similar ruling.  As I said before, they have an answer  or “out” for anything that they propose, which always leads to the courts and $$$$  for them.  And, Arizona’s  HB 2717 had a restriction on incentives for HOA attorneys to  run to the courts on every little thing — cut the fee awards to the them — rather than the HOA and homeowner trying to work it out first. It has been removed by the sponsor.

Here’s a few quotes from the California opinion, emphasis added.

 

Treating CC&R’s as a contract such that they are sufficient to waive the right to trial by jury does not comport with the importance of the right waived. CC&R’s are notoriously lengthy, are adhesive in nature, are written by developers perhaps years before many owners buy, and often, as here with regard to the waiver of trial by jury, cannot be modified by the association. Further, the document is not signed by the parties.” (Treo, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1066–1067.)

 

CC&R’s are generally, as here, adhesive and unilateral and those bound by their terms may only have constructive notice of those terms and no contractual relationship with the developer who drafted the CC&R’s.

(This case focuses on the narrower question of waiver of jury trial).

Source:  Villa Vicenza v. Nobel Court Dev., 191 Cal. App. 4Th 963 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Jan. 1, 2011).

co-opting the HOA “homeowners bill of rights”

 

In 2008 the 1994 UCIOA (Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act) was modified to accommodate the outcry from homeowner rights advocates.  This shortened version is known as the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Bill of Rights Act (UCIOBORA), and is a political maneuver to co-opt the real meaning and intent of a “bill of rights.”  Here’s an explanatory excerpt from UCIOBORA:

 

Further, ULC [Uniform Law Commissioners] acknowledges that it will often not be feasible to enact UCIOA 3.0, in part because of the difficulty drafters in the States may encounter in integrating any new adoption of the existing Uniform Acts with the laws that may already exist in a particular state.  For these reasons, ULC  promulgated a free-standing and relatively short Uniform Act that addresses all of the ‘association versus unit owner’ issues touched on during the drafting of the 2008 UCIOA amendments. The free-standing Act is known as the Uniform Common Interest Owners Bill Of Rights Act or “UCIOBORA”. While not all sections of UCIOBORA are identical to UCIOA 3.0, the concepts underlying each Act are the same, and are adjusted simply to recognize the simplified nature of UCIOBORA.
 
 
In short, UCIOA wasn’t selling.  It seems that UCIOBORA is the sad result of the political motives to get UCIOA selling again. It’s a document that does not at all read like the US Bill of Rights, or any state constitution’s Declaration of Rights (state constitution equivalent of the Bill of Rights), or even the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (France, 1793).  Far from it.  Rather it reads like your current CC&Rs and UCIOA with a number of concessions to reality.  However, it lacks substantive protections of homeowner rights, such as: a fair and just due process by means of an independent tribunal; fair elections procedures with equal and fair access to membership lists, and equal opportunity appearances in the HOA newsletter/website; restrictions on the right to foreclose, since the HOA is not in the same position as a lender who had advanced hard cash; and enforcement by means of penalties against board violations of the governing documents, otherwise all such laws are just recommendations dependent on the goodwill of the affected persons.
 
A homeowners bill of rights is necessary because the Constitution with its Bill of Rights amendments does not apply to private HOA governments.  HOA governments operate outside the Constitution, which is greatly desired and defended by HOA supporters as they would not be able to act in ways that a civil government cannot act.  A statement in a declaration that says that the HOA is subject to the Constitution is meaningless, since the Constitution does not apply to private entities.  What is necessary is a statement that the HOA acknowledges the Constitution as the supreme law of the land and irrevocably agrees to be subject to it  as if it were indeed a government entity.
 
 
Short History
In 1997, Elizabeth McMahon of AHRC filed a Homeowners Bill of Rights with the California Law Review Commission looking into revising California’s HOA statutes.  In 2000, George K. Staropoli submitted a statement to the Arizona Interim HOA Committee, Homeowner’s Declaration of Independence from the HOA system of government.  In 2006, AARP produced a public policy statement, A Bill of Rights for Homeowners in Associations, written by Houston attorney David Kahne.  In 2006 the legal-academic aristocrats (lawyers for the real estate interests) at a Texas senate hearing proposed a Texas Uniform Planned Community Act (TUPCA).  Responding to Texas homeowner rights advocates, the committee was told that UCIOA (the model act for TUPCA) was being modified to include a bill of rights section.  In 2008, George K. Staropoli informed the California Law Review Commission of a proper Members Bill of Rights section to the Davis-Stirling Act (This section was later  dropped from the revision).
 
 

Calif. HOA laws and community service districts

November 18, 2010

                                                                                                                                   email letter

Mr. Brian Hebert

Executive Secretary

California Law Review Commission
4000 Middlefield Road, Room D-1
Palo Alto, California 94303-4739

                                                                                       re: Study H-855

                                                                                       Memo 2010-8

                                                                                       CID Law

Dear Mr. Hebert:

 I am quite disappointed with the Commission’s continued effort to replace the Davis-Stirling using a carbon copy with revisions dealing with the minutia of CID operations.  And still refusing to recognize CIDs as de facto governments, much as Cuba is an unrecognized but de facto government.  Furthermore, CLRC has seen fit to retain the placement of these special laws for the governance of communities under the Civil Code. 

 It appears that the special interest agenda, promoted by the national lobbying trade organization, Community Associations Institute (CAI), still dominates the Commission’s thinking.  Is the Commission aware of CAI’s repudiation of the US Constitution when it wrote in its amicus brief to the NJ appellate court in Twin Rivers that, “In the context of community associations, the unwise extension of constitutional rights to the use of private property by members . . . ” ? Committee For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Association (TRHA), Docket No. C-121-00, 2004.

Davis-Stirling and the Commission’s proposed rewrite continue to reflect the State’s exercise of “coercive power”, and “significant encouragement, either overt or covert”  with regard to CIDs.  The CID Laws portray the CID  in a “symbiotic relationship” with the state, “entwined with governmental policies,” and the state government is “entwined in [the CID’s] management or control.”  Such conditions give easy rise to declaring the CID as a state actor.  (See the summary of state action criteria as set forth by the US Supreme Court in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 2001).

I cannot understand why the Commission continues to permit agreements by private parties to create local, private governments that are authoritarian and that deny homeowners their rights and freedoms to which they would otherwise be entitled.  These “declarations” and CC&Rs are just that – devises to circumvent the application of constitutional protections and prohibitions with respect to local communities.  The unsuspecting public is bound to these so-called agreements by virtue of taking hold on their deed sight unseen, without ever having to read, understand or sign these CC&Rs.  The filing of these CC&Rs alone are necessary and sufficient to bind the homeowner, under servitude laws, and not contract law; where the legal-academic aristocrats offer advice that if a conflict exists between servitude law and constitutional law, servitudes law should prevail. (See Restatement Third, Property: Servitudes, § 3.1, comment h).

 It is even more disturbing when existing California law, and similar laws in other states, permit the ability to attain the advertised benefits to the greater community of California and to the local CID community under municipality laws.  In general, they are the special taxing district laws, and in California they are the District and Community Service District Codes (see Government Code, Title 6, §§ 58000 and 61000 et seq. below for the relevant excerpts).  If town hall democracy, local autonomy and the “voice of the community” are indeed the objectives of good government, then the District Code  will meet these objectives, where the replacement of Davis-Stirling is nothing more than a top-down imposition on the local community of special laws for private organizations.  The CID would be subject to the 14th Amendment as are all other public entities, and the laws of the land would indeed be equal for all people.

 I outline the simple method for accomplishing the transformation of CIDs to taxing districts in Chapter 2 of
Understanding the New America of HOA-Lands  (attached for your edification and convenience).  Chapter 3  explores ideal HOA constitutions and Chapter 4 is a lengthy discussion of the two forms of American political government:  HOAs and public entities.


 The Commission should cease and desist its current efforts to further promote the establishment of the second form of American political government, the CID, and return to supporting the principles of democratic government under the US and California Constitutions.

 

Respectfully,

George K. Staropoli

President

Citizens for Constitutional Local Government

 

References

California  Government Code Title 6,  Districts, Division 1, General, § 58000 et seq., and in particular Division 3, Community Service Districts, § 61000 et seq. as relevant.

 

§ 61001.

(a) The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

(1) The differences among California’s communities reflect the broad diversity of the state’s population, geography, natural resources, history, and economy.

 

(b) The Legislature finds and declares that for many communities,community services districts may be any of the following:

(1) A permanent form of governance that can provide locally adequate levels of public facilities and services.

(3) A form of governance that can serve as an alternative to the incorporation of a new city.

 

(c) In enacting this division, it is the intent of the Legislature: (1) To continue a broad statutory authority for a class of limited-purpose special districts to provide a wide variety of public facilities and services.

(3) That residents, property owners, and public officials use the powers and procedures provided by the Community Services District Law to meet the diversity of the local conditions, circumstances, and resources.

 

Appellate court holds HOA board to fiduciary obligations of good faith and negligence

The California appellate court in Telford[i] has taken a long sought defense in favor of homeowners against the negligence and bad faith dealings by the board, stating that the homeowners’ association is not relievedfrom liability for breach of its fiduciary duties because it occupied ‘a particularly elevated position of trust’ due to its quasi-governmental status and ‘the many interests it monitors and services it performs.(Emphasis added). The court added that:  “because a homeowners’ association stands in a fiduciary relationship with the member homeowners,” a failure to monitor the project was a breach of its fiduciary duties to the memebrs in general. (Understand that the board does not have a fiduciary duty to any one specific member).

This single opinion strikes at one defect in the HOA legal scheme that was necessary for the widespread adoption and mass marketing of HOAs, the “free ride.” No longer will HOA boards get a free ride under the business judgment rule, but will now be held to act responsibly under its quasi-governmental legal status. The “free ride” laws and rulings were necessary to get uninformed, untrained and, in many cases, conscripted members, to join the board without any accountability. Now, this holding places a real-life awakening to the propaganda and myth that the HOA has no downside.

In this case, plaintiff Telford filed suit against the board on the basis of an approved construction project by a neighbor, charging a loss of quiet enjoyment, emotional stress, public and private nuisance, and negligence in enforcing compliance with the governing documents. (It is important to note that this was not a claim of contractual violations). Telford also charged that the approval was not only negligent, but unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith” as its approval was based on friendships between the board and the member. Here, we are not only concerned with those broad powers and obligations granted to the board, but the application of the business judgment rule [BJR] that governs the broad, discretionary powers granted to the board. The Court repeated the precise ruling in Lamden (often neglected in CAI attorney citations): deference is accorded only if the association has acted ‘upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests of the community association and its members.’” BJR is not a grant of unlimited powers to the board.

Furthermore, with respect to a breach of fiduciary duty, the Court stated that a “breach of fiduciary duty is a tort.” And as I mentioned elsewhere, a tort is a common law wrongful act that allows for punitive damages against the board and/or individual director. A tort provides a strng counter-measure against the one-sided financial damages that HOA boards are entitled under state laws and the governing documents.

A second very important opinion that is addressed in Telford is the HOA board’s defense that there is an exculpatory clause in the governing documents; that is, a clause that grants the board immunity from liability as a result of its actions. The Court held, however, that this type of clause was against public policy and therefore invalid:

The law has traditionally viewed with disfavor attempts to secure insulation from one’s own negligence or wilful misconduct[.] “Furthermore, it is the express statutory policy of this state that `[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from the responsibility for his own fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.’”

Punitive damages are monetary compensation awarded to an injured party that goes beyond that which is necessary to compensate the individual for losses, and that is intended to punish the wrongdoer.

Punitive damages can serve to “police” the HOA board in view of the fact that state laws and the governing documents do not contain penalties, and serve to protect boards from accountability.  See Public Policy, Tort Law and Planned Communities[ii].
 
 

 

 

Reference 

i Telford v. Sagewood HOA, No. E048483, Cal. App. 4th Dist., Nov. 16, 2010.

ii  http://pvtgov.org/pvtgov/downloads/policy-torts.pdf