Author: HOAGOV
HOA Case History: state actors or mini/quasi government
- Cohen v. Kite Hill,142 Cal App 3d 642 (1983) (A homeowners association board is in effect “a quasi-government entity paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a municipal government.”)
- Gerber v. Long Boat Harbour, 757 F Supp. 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (court enforcement of private agreements in condo declarations is a state action; flag; free speech).
- Hudgens v. NLRB 424 US 507 (1976) (functions of a municipality, citing Marsh; shopping center)
- Marsh V. Alabama, 326 US 501 (1946) (company town and public functions)
- Shelly v. Kraemer 334 US 1 (prohibitive state actions by use of judicial enforcement as state was fully aware of the illegal use of the courts; judicial enforcement harms constitutional rights)
- Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 US 483, (1954) (rational basis for scrutiny)
- Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468; (2000) (quasi-government; board meetings public forums similar to government body;defamation)
- Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 131 Cal. App. 3d 182 (1982) (HOA has attributes that “in many ways approximate a municipality . . . close to a characterization as a company town.”)
- Surfside 84 v. Mullen Ct. of Special Appeals of Maryland, No. 495 (September 1984) (state action; procedural due process; lack of notice; CAI Reporter).
- Brock v. Watergate 502 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4 Dist. App. (1987)( public functiuons test; close nexus criteria; HOA lacks character of a company town)
- Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers, 929 A.2d 1060 (NJ 2007) (HOA not state actor per NJ Scmidt version of Marsh; Not US but NJ Const. case).
- Indian Lake v. Director of Revenue, 813 SW 2d 305 (not civic organization)
- Midlake v. Cappuccio, 673 A 2d 340, Pa. Super. (1996) (condo is a pvt organization, not muni govt; not a company town)
- Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747, Ariz. App. Div. 2 (1974) (state action; classification; enforce age restrictions;”court to enforce constitutional commands”; restriction was a permissible government interest).
- S.O.C. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 43 P 3rd 243 (Nev. 2001) (state action; public functions; delegating functions to private persons; commericial advertising on private property).
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Terre Du Lac Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. App. 1987). (quasi govt) (how a homeowner's association operates as a "quasi-governmental entity," not authority for the concept that an association's "quasi-governmental" actions are state actions;).
- Westphal v. Lake Lotawana, 95 SW 3d 144 (Mo. App. 2003) (no support for “close nexus” state action).
Note:
- The above cases in bold are color coded. Red is adverse to constitutional protections; Blue is favorable; black in neutral.
- There are 3 case against and 4 cases in favor. Two were not dispositive. The “against” cases were all based on a “public functions” test.
- The non-bold cases concern related issues not involving an HOA/condo, such as state action, public functions, or mini/quasi governments.
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The above findings are not exhaustive and reflect the analysis of some 153 HOA/condo , state action cases on a federal and state level.
Court appointed Receiver files punitive damages against HOA attorney
States Rights: the transfer of power from Washington to private government HOAs
I am pleased to hear the whispers of substantive issues regarding the institution of HOAs that undermine our democratic principles of government as found in this Washington Post article. Among the Christmas cards to one homeowner, a warning, “Several state courts have ruled that by agreeing to abide by homeowners association rules, home buyers relinquish some constitutional rights,” and who points out there are some limits on HOAs. But, I would like to clarify that these few rights had to be fought for in each state legislature on a piecemeal basis – restoring those rights taken away by the HOA declaration “agreement.”
The media must follow in this reporter’s footsteps and stop being an active participant in the Unspoken Alliance of “No Negatives About HOAs!” The media must understand that “States Rights” is nothing more than the transfer of political power from Washington to the state legislatures. State legislatures who, in turn, openly and eagerly support the transfer of political power to local private governments — homeowners associations — unanswerable to the US Constitution as required of all public forms of civil government.
These unrecognized, de facto governments hold power by the mere filing of a subdivision declaration of covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs), which is necessary and sufficient to bind unsuspecting home buyers. Declarations that bind without the need for the buyer to have read or to have explicitly signed-off on these relinquishments of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities, absent of any equal protection of the laws, and absent of any due process protections loss of life, liberty and property.
Perhaps we shall see a second effort by a number of states to amend and rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, one that attempts to justify and defend this disgraceful state of affairs by a country once held in high esteem as the ideal democracy. This second amendment would sanction “chartered” private governments with their imposed, unconscionable adhesion agreements that provide for the carte blanche surrender of constitutional rights, and with their powers that include the loss of private property rights by the votes of others without the need for the consent of the affected homeowners. This amendment would legitimize these declarations of CC&Rs that do not recognize any “inalienable rights” at the time of purchase, and that permit ex post facto amendments to render the so-called sacrosanct declaration a meaningless pieces of paper. A travesty of our American democracy.
Who will stand up and fight for Lady Justice? Qui Pro Domina Justitia Sequitur (“who prosecutes on behalf of Lady Justice?“, DOJ seal). Who will defend and preserve our principles of democratic government?
The continuing saga to quash HOA due process protections by the State of Arizona
On Feb. 11, 2009 my attempt to intervene in the Arizona Meritt superior court appeal of an DBFLS petition was denied. The Meritt complaint was based solely on the superior court decision in Waugaman, as no argument occurred in the Meritt default decision. I was required to file an Answer in defense of the statute to the HOA complaint that sought a declaration of unconstitutional adjudication of HOA disputes by DFBLS.
This denial was a surprising event given that Meritt was a default decision on a question of the constitutionality of a statute, and I had introduced the Attorney General’s brief in support of constitutionality from Waugaman in my Answer. In Waugaman, the AG’s brief was given a single line in the decision, a decision that quoted the HOA’s argument: “the Attorney General’s office fails to identify a single way in which the [Department] actually exerts regulatory authority over planned communities.” The focus was solely on whether or not the AG’s brief satisfactorily addressed the one issue of concern to the court, and to the HOA: the extent of regulatory authority. (For a clarification of the roles played by these cases, see my earlier comments on the Gelb petition at Will AZ Supreme Court do justice for 1 million HOA members? )
Filing as a Pro Per, this knowledgeable layman argued, among other things,
Here [HOA adjudication] there is a direct statutory adjudication authority and there is no need to divine legislative intent and tie it to an agency’s regulatory mission. The decision regarding constitutionality must therefore fall to the Bennett or four-fold test used in both Hancock and Cactus Wren. There is nothing in the Bennett test that considers proper regulatory authority per se. The requirement for adjudication as ancillary to proper regulatory authority is not a requirement of the Bennett four-fold test . . . . (¶ 10, p. 5).
In view of the facts in Hancock contained in paragraph 10, this fixation on regulatory authority is misplaced in view of the direct statutory authority to adjudicate contractual disputes in both the Act and planned communities. (¶ 11, p. 7).
This essential argument finding error with the Waugaman decision’s focus on the extent of regulatory authority (used as sole authority in Meritt, and essentially repeated in the Gelb appeal) is more elegantly presented in part 3 of the Nov. 30, 2010 Gelb Petition, “III. A.R.S. § 41-2198 is a Constitutional Delegation of Authority to An Administrative Agency and Does Not Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine.” (p. 11). Gelb argued,
The Court of Appeals incorrectly determined § 41-2198(3) violated Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution because there was “no nexus between the regulatory authority or purpose of the DFBLS and the authority to regulate planned communities.” . . . Significantly, the word “nexus” does not appear in either decision. Nor does either case require “a nexus between the primary regulatory purpose of the [agency] and the adjudicatory authority granted in the Administrative Process” as stated in the Court of Appeals opinion.
Furthermore, in undertaking this analysis of the constitutional delegation of powers to an agency, the Gelb appellate court stated, “In applying these factors, we are mindful that duly enacted laws are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality and any doubts should be resolved in favor of upholding a statute against constitutional challenges.” Additional Petition arguments cited authority in support of a blending of functions, and agency adjudication as assisting the judiciary rather than usurping its powers as held in the Gelb opinion. These arguments attacked the court’s conclusion that the HOA had overcome “this strong presumption of constitutionality” of a statute.
Let us hope that the Arizona Supreme Court will hear this Petition and do justice on behalf of the people, an estimated 1 million plus Arizonans living in HOAs and condos.
